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How does financial integration impact capital accumulation, current-account dynamics, and cross-country
inequality? We investigate this question within a two-country, general-equilibrium, incomplete-markets
model that focuses on the importance of idiosyncratic entrepreneurial risk— a risk that introduces,
not only a precautionary motive for saving, but also a wedge between the interest rate and the marginal
product of capital. Our contribution is to show that this friction provides a simple explanation for the
emergence of global imbalances, a resolution to the empirical puzzle that capital often fails to flow
from the rich or slow-growing countries to the poor or fast-growing ones, and a set of policy lessons
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The last two or three decades have been characterized by signiﬁcant liberalization of international
capital ﬂows. This, in turn, appears to have facilitated the rise of signiﬁcant global imbalances—a
large foreign debt on the side of the United States along with vast currency reserves and big positive
holdings of US Treasury securities on the side of emerging countries such as China. Furthermore,
whereas the standard neoclassical paradigm predicts that capital should be ﬂowing from the rich to
the poor, or from the least-growing to the fastest-growing countries, the empirical evidence often
suggests the opposite direction of capital ﬂows (Gourinchas and Jeanne, 2008).
These observations, and more generally the themes of ﬁnancial integration and global imbalances,
have motivated a large body of research.1 In this paper, we contribute to this growing literature
by studying the global macroeconomic eﬀects of ﬁnancial integration in the presence of a certain
market friction—uninsurable idiosyncratic entrepreneurial risk.
Our focus on this friction is motivated, not only by the fact that entrepreneurship is of obvious
empirical relevance, but also by the observation that this friction can play a crucial role in capi-
tal accumulation and productivity growth. Indeed, this friction introduces both a precautionary
motive for saving, as entrepreneurs seek to self-insure against the uninsurable risk in their income,
and a wedge between the interest rate and the marginal product of capital, as entrepreneurs require
a (private) risk premium in compensation for the risk they face in their entrepreneurial activity.
Furthermore, this wedge is likely to vary across countries, with, say, entrepreneurs in China pre-
sumably enjoying less risk sharing and hence facing a higher wedge than those in the United States.
Our contribution is to show how cross-country diﬀerences in this wedge may help explain a num-
ber of stylized facts—such as the persistence of cross-country inequality, the emergence of global
imbalances, and the failure of capital to ﬂow from the rich or slow-growing countries to the poor
or fast-growing ones—while also providing a distinct set of policy lessons regarding the dynamic
eﬀects of capital-account liberalization.2
Preview of model. We conduct our theoretical exercise within a tractable, general-equilibrium,
incomplete-markets model. There are two economies (countries), each of which is populated by a
continuum of households (families). Each family includes a worker and an entrepreneur. The
worker supplies his labor in the domestic labor market; the entrepreneur runs a private business
1See, for example, Aoki, Benigno, and Kiyotaki (2009), Blanchard, Giavazzi, and Sa (2005), Boyd and Smith
(1997), Broner and Ventura (2008), Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas (2008), Engel and Rogers (2006), Fogli and
Perri (2006), Gertler and Rogoﬀ (1990), Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006), Gourinchas and Rey (2007), Hausmann and
Sturzenegger (2006), Hunt and Rebucci (2005), Kraay and Ventura (2007), Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007), Lucas
(1990), McGrattan and Prescott (2007), Mendoza, Quadrini, and Rios-Rull (2007, 2008), Obstefeld and Rogoﬀ (2004),
Prasad, Rajan, and Subramanian (2007), Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2004), and Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2009).
2Borrowing constraints, although not explicitly considered here, are complementary sources of a wedge between
the “external” and the “internal” return to capital. This oﬀers a useful re-interpretation of our contribution. As it will
become clear, our key results hinge on the properties that the aforementioned wedge is positive and decreasing with
wealth—properties that may hold whether the wedge originates in idiosyncratic risk or in borrowing constraints.
2that operates a constant-returns-to-scale technology, employs labor from the domestic labor market,
and uses the capital stock owned by her family. All households can freely trade a safe asset,
but can diversify only a fraction of the idiosyncratic shocks hitting their private ﬁrms. The two
countries diﬀer in the magnitude of the uninsurable risk—with the “North” enjoying better risk-
sharing possibilities and hence less risk than the “South”—but are otherwise identical.
Within this model, we deﬁne “ﬁnancial autarchy” as the regime in which the market for the safe
asset clears on a country-wide level, and “ﬁnancial integration” as the regime in which this market
clears on a world-wide level. We then study the steady states that obtain under these two regimes,
as well as the entire transitional dynamics of the global economy between the two steady states.
Preview of results. Under ﬁnancial autarchy, the South features a lower interest rate. This is
due to the stronger demand for precautionary saving implied by the larger amount of undiversiﬁable
idiosyncratic risk (or, in an extension, due to the lower supply of the safe asset). Despite its lower
interest rate, however, the South may also have a lower capital stock and a lower level of income
than the North. This is because the South faces a higher wedge between the marginal product of
capital and the interest rate. It follows that, prior to ﬁnancial integration, the South identiﬁes the
poor, capital-scarce country, whereas the North identiﬁes the rich, capital-abundant country.
Because the South has a lower autarchic interest rate than the North, ﬁnancial integration
triggers the North to run large current-account deﬁcits and, symmetrically, the South to accumulate
a large positive foreign asset position. Intuitively, this is because the North has a comparative
advantage in supplying the safe asset: the North “exports” this asset by running current-account
deﬁcits. What is more, as ﬁnancial integration causes the interest rate to rise in the South, the
opportunity cost of capital goes up and the capital stock goes down, thereby depressing domestic
wages and output. Conversely, the North experiences a boom.
If the North is interpreted as the United States, and the South as China or other emerging
economies, these results help explain the signiﬁcant “global imbalances” that the world economy
has experienced in recent history. Furthermore, they help explain why ﬁnancial globalization may
initially exacerbate cross-country inequality, and why capital may often fail to ﬂow from the rich,
capital-abundant countries to the poor, capital-scarce ones.
Interestingly, though, the long-run eﬀects of ﬁnancial integration can be quite diﬀerent. Because
ﬁnancial integration permits the South to save abroad at higher returns than otherwise, the South
is able to accumulate more and more wealth over time. As this happens, the willingness to take
risk increases, the wedge between the interest rate and the marginal product of capital falls, and
the capital stock increases. As a result, in the new steady state the South may well end up with
higher levels of capital, wages, output and consumption than in its autarchic steady state. Our
model therefore predicts that ﬁnancial integration may help poor countries in the long run, even
as it hurts them on impact—and may reduce cross-country inequality in the long run, even as it
increases it on impact.
3Furthermore, because of the aforementioned wealth accumulation and the consequent increase
in risk taking, the transition in the South may feature a reallocation of saving from safe but low-
return investment opportunities to risky but high-return ones. As a result, the South experiences
an acceleration in its TFP growth, while the converse is true for the North. Along with the property
that the South runs current-account surpluses, while the North runs current-account deﬁcits, this
result means that capital ﬂows from the faster growing countries to the slower growing ones—a
prediction that is the opposite of the one made by the standard neoclassical paradigm and that
helps resolve the empirical puzzle documented by Gourinchas and Jeanne (2008).
Combined, our results provide, not only a possible explanation to certain stylized facts, but also
a distinct policy lesson: the beneﬁts of capital-account liberalization for less developed economies
may be higher in the long run than on the impact of the reform. As already noted, the key intuition
is that ﬁnancial integration helps agents in the South accumulate more wealth over time, which in
turn permits them to mitigate the friction they face in their entrepreneurial activities. We reinforce
this intuition by studying the welfare eﬀects of ﬁnancial integration in our model.
Upon ﬁnancial integration, the South’s poor tend to lose for two complementary reasons: the
increase in interest rates means an increase in the cost of borrowing; and the initial outﬂow of
capital means a reduction in their wages. In contrast, the rich gain because of the higher returns to
their saving and of the lower labor costs in their private businesses. But as time passes and capital
eventually reaches higher levels than under autarchy, the resulting increase in wages alleviates the
burden of agents who happen to be poor at that point in time, and it even leads to beneﬁts for
most of them. Overall, at the time of the reform, almost everyone, except for the very rich, suﬀers
welfare losses, and the poor more so than anyone else; but among the agents living in the future
integrated world almost everyone gains from the reform, except for the very rich, and the poor and
middle classes more so than anyone else. Once again, this highlights the distinct eﬀects that our
analysis brings to light for the impact of integration on current versus future generations.3
Related literature. Our paper belongs to a large, and growing, literature that uses Bewley-
type models to study various macroeconomic implications of incomplete markets. Key references
include Aiyagari (1994), Huggett (1997), Krusell and Smith (1998), and Rios-Rull (1994); see Heath-
cote, Storesletten, and Violante (2009) and Krusell and Smith (2006) for eclectic reviews. The bulk
of this literature focuses on idiosyncratic endowment or labor-income risk. Important exceptions
are Angeletos and Calvet (2000, 2006) and Angeletos (2007), which are among the ﬁrst papers to
emphasize the distinct implications of idiosyncratic investment risk for aggregate saving within the
context of the neoclassical growth model.4 Our paper starts by extending Angeletos (2007) to a
3Complementary in this regard is Aoki, Benigno and Kiyotaki (2009), which also stresses the importance of
studying the intertemporal costs and beneﬁts of ﬁnancial integration, albeit in a diﬀerent model than ours.
4Other papers that touch the same theme, but focus on diﬀerent questions, include Angeletos and Panousi (2009),
Benhabib and Zhou (2008), Cagetti and De Nardi (2006), Giesecke and Goldberg (2008), Quadrini (2000), Covas
(2006), Meh and Quadrini (2006), Kitao (2007), and Panousi (2010).
4two-country open-economy setting. Our contribution is then to study how cross-country diﬀerences
in the level of idiosyncratic entrepreneurial or investment risk impact global macroeconomic dynam-
ics. In independent parallel work, Corneli (2010) undertakes a similar exercise and obtains closely
related results.
As in our paper, Mendoza, Quadrini, and Rios-Rull (2008) study how cross-country diﬀerences
in domestic risk sharing can help explain signiﬁcant and persistent global imbalances. See also
Willen (2004) for an earlier take on the same key insight. However, unlike our paper, this work
rules out endogenous capital accumulation and/or idiosyncratic investment risk.5 It is precisely the
combination of these two features that distinguishes our theoretical exercise and that explains the
novelty of our results.
Also closely related are Buera and Shin (2010) and Sandri (2010). Buera and Shin’s model shares
the two key features of our model, namely capital accumulation and entrepreneurial risk, but adds a
number of other ingredients, such as borrowing constraints, occupational choice, and cross-sectional
distortions in the allocation of capital. By assuming that capital-account liberalization comes in
tandem with a structural reform that removes these distortions, they obtain an acceleration in
TFP growth. At the same time, a surge in current-account surpluses occurs for reasons similar to
ours. Their paper and ours are thus highly complementary.6 Sandri considers a one-country model
that also features entrepreneurial risk, but focuses on a diﬀerent policy exercise. In particular, he
studies a reform that permits some agents to switch from “farmers” to “entrepreneurs”. Because
entrepreneurial activity is assumed to face more risk than farming, this means an increase in the
level of idiosyncratic risk and hence a surge in precautionary saving, which in turn helps generate
current-account surpluses. A similar mechanism operates in Carroll and Jeane (2009), except that
there the driving force is an increase in idiosyncratic labor-income risk.
Our paper also shares with Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas (2008) the idea that global im-
balances are explained, in a certain sense, by a shortage of assets in the South. But whereas that
paper assumes that the South has a lower capacity in supplying any asset, we only assume that the
North has a comparative advantage in supplying the relatively safer assets. This in turn can be the
case, not because of diﬀerent technologies, but simply because the North has a weaker demand for
precautionary saving. Furthermore, that paper rules out capital accumulation, thus also ruling out
the distinct dynamic eﬀects that are at the core of our contribution.
Layout. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3
characterizes the general equilibrium. Section 4 studies the autarchic and integrated steady states,
5Mendoza et al. (2008) allow for a certain type of investment risk, but rule out capital accumulation: the
investment opportunity in that paper is an exogenous “Lucas tree”. Mendoza et al. (2009), on the other hand, allow
for capital accumulation, but rule out idiosyncratic investment risk. Finally, Willen (2004) studies an endowment
economy, thus ruling out both capital accumulation and idiosyncratic investment risk.
6The comparative advantage of their paper is that it contains a richer quantitative exercise, while that of our
analysis rests on its increased tractability and the consequent clarity of the theoretical insights.
5section 5 the transitional dynamics between the two, and section 6 the welfare implications. Section
7 considers a useful extension. Section 8 concludes. The proofs are delegated to the appendix.
2 The model
Our model is a two-country variant of the closed-economy model of Angeletos (2007). There are
two countries, indexed by j 2 f1;2g; and a single good, which can be used for either consumption
or investment purposes. Each country is populated by a continuum of inﬁnitely-lived households,
indexed by i and distributed uniformly over [0;1]. Each household includes a worker and a producer
(“entrepreneur”). The worker supplies his labor inelastically to the domestic labor market. The
entrepreneur runs a privately-held ﬁrm (“family business”). Each household can freely save or borrow
in the riskless bond—up to a natural borrowing constraint—and can accumulate physical capital
within its own family business. Firms are hit by idiosyncratic shocks, which the households can only
partially diversify. Finally, to maintain tractability, we abstract from any aggregate uncertainty.
We also let the time be continuous, indexed by t 2 [0;1).
Preferences take an Epstein-Zin speciﬁcation, which permits us to distinguish intertemporal
substitution from risk aversion. Fix a household i in county j. Her preferences are deﬁned as the
limit, for t ! 0, of the solution to the following recursive speciﬁcation:
Uijt =
(












where  > 0 is the discount rate,  > 0 is the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion, and  > 0 is the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution.7
The ﬁnancial wealth of this household, denoted by xijt, is the sum of its holdings in private
capital, kijt, and in the riskless bond, bijt:
xijt = kijt + bijt : (2)
The evolution of xijt is given by the following budget constraint:
dxijt = dijt + [Rtbijt + !jt   cijt]dt + dTijt : (3)
Here, dijt is the household’s capital income (i.e., the proﬁts from the private ﬁrm it owns), Rjt is
the interest rate on the riskless bond, !jt is the wage rate, cijt is the household’s consumption, and
dTijt is a transfer that captures risk-sharing opportunities (to be deﬁned later on).
7Standard expected utility is nested for  = 1=; in this case, Uijt = Et
R 1
t e
 sU(cijs)ds, where U(c) =
c1 1=
1 1= .
We allow for  6= 1= so as to facilitate a more precise understanding of the underlying forces in our environment and
a better calibration. However, none of our results rest on letting  6= 1=.
6Whereas the sequences of the wage and the interest rate are deterministic (due to the absence
of aggregate risk), ﬁrm proﬁts, and hence household capital income, are subject to undiversiﬁed
idiosyncratic risk:
dijt = [F(kijt;nijt)   !jtnijt   kijt]dt + jkijtdzijt : (4)
Here, nijt is the amount of labor the ﬁrm hires in the competitive labor market,  is the mean depre-
ciation rate, and F is a constant-returns-to-scale neoclassical production function. For simplicity,
we assume a Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcation: F(k;n) = kn1 , with  2 (0;1).
Idiosyncratic risk is introduced through dzijt, a standard Wiener process that is i.i.d. across
agents and time. Literally taken, dzijt represents a stochastic depreciation, or productivity, shock.
However, we wish to interpret this shock more broadly as encompassing various sources of idiosyn-
cratic risk in the entrepreneurial activity and, more generally, in the returns to private investment.
The scalar j then parameterizes the level of this risk in country j.
Since this risk is purely idiosyncratic, agents would be able to obtain full insurance against it
if ﬁnancial markets were complete. A number of reasons—moral hazard, adverse selection, costly
state veriﬁcation, ineﬃcient legal and enforcement systems, or mere lack of sophistication—may
explain why this does not happen in the real world. In this paper, as in most other papers in the
Bewley tradition, we abstract from the deeper micro-foundations of incomplete markets. Instead,
we exogenously impose that the available risk-sharing possibilities are limited, and more severely so
in the South. We capture this by assuming that:
dTijt =  jjkijtdzijt ; (5)
for some j 2 (0;1). This assumption can also be justiﬁed by introducing an exogenous asset
structure that permits agents to diversify only certain components of their idiosyncratic risk, or by
letting them sell equity on only a fraction of their proﬁts. Either way, the scalar j measures the
fraction of idiosyncratic risk that agents are able to diversify in country j; this is what deﬁnes the
level of ﬁnancial development in our model.
Combining conditions (3)-(5), we get that the household budget reduces to:
dxijt = d~ it + [Rtbijt + !jt   cijt]dt ; (6)
where
d~ ijt  dijt + dTijt = [F(kijt;nijt)   !jtnijt   kijt]dt + (1   j)jkijtdzijt :
It is then evident that the quantity ~ j  (1 j)j measures the amount of undiversiﬁable idiosyn-
cratic risk in country j. We henceforth impose ~ 2 < ~ 1, which permit us to identify country 1 as
the country with a lower level of uninsurable entrepreneurial risk—and, in this particular sense, as
7the country with the more advanced ﬁnancial markets. We accordingly refer to country 1 as the
“North” or the “developed” economy, and to country 2 as the “South” or the “developing” economy.
At this point, we would like to invite the reader to maintain a ﬂexible interpretation of the
assumption that ~ 2 > ~ 1. For example, entrepreneurial risk may be higher in developing economies
because, in comparison to developed economies such as the United States, developing economies
such as China, India, and Mexico appear to face more severe agency and/or enforcement problems.
Government corruption and weak property rights also contribute to higher levels of idiosyncratic
entrepreneurial risk in developing economies: some times the entrepreneur is the fortunate recipient
of preferential treatment by corrupt politicians and bureaucrats, some times he is the unfortunate
victim. Finally, as tax and regulatory policies tend to be more volatile in these economies, the
idiosyncratic incidence of these policies appears to be more volatile as well, contributing to additional
risk in entrepreneurial activity.
3 Equilibrium
Let Yjt;Cjt;Njt;Kjt; and Bjt denote the aggregate levels of output, consumption, employment,
capital, and bond holdings in country j at date t (that is, the cross-sectional averages of yijt;cijt
and so on). We consider two policy regimes. In the ﬁrst, countries are in ﬁnancial autarchy: the
riskless bond cannot move across borders. In the second, they are ﬁnancially integrated: countries
can borrow and lend to one another. We deﬁne the corresponding equilibrium concepts as follows.
Deﬁnition 1. An autarchic equilibrium consists of a deterministic sequence of country-speciﬁc
interest rates, wages, and macroeconomic quantities, fRjt;!jt;Yjt;Cjt;Njt;Kjtgt2[0;1) for j 2 f1;2g,
and a collection of individual contingent plans, fcijt;nijt;kijt;bijtgt2[0;1) for i 2 [0;1];j 2 f1;2g,
such that the following are true: (i) individual plans are optimal given the sequences of prices; (ii)
macroeconomic quantities are obtained by aggregating individual plans; (iii) labor and bond markets
clear at the country level, namely Njt = 1 and Bjt = 0 for all j;t.
Deﬁnition 2. An integrated equilibrium consists of a deterministic sequence of world-wide inter-
est rates, fRtgt2[0;1), a deterministic sequence of country-speciﬁc wages and macroeconomic quan-
tities, f!jt;Yjt;Cjt;Njt;Kjtgt2[0;1) for j 2 f1;2g, and a collection of individual contingent plans,
(fcijt;nijt;kijt;bijtgt2[0;1))i2[0;1] for i 2 [0;1];j 2 f1;2g, such that the following are true: (i) indi-
vidual plans are optimal given the sequences of prices; (ii) macroeconomic quantities are obtained
by aggregating individual plans; (iii) labor markets clear at the country level, namely Njt = 1 for all
j;t; (iv) the bond market clears at the world level, namely B1t + B2t = 0 for all t.
In the remaining of this section, we ﬁrst characterize the individual household’s problem for a
given sequence of wages and interest rates. We then proceed to characterize the general equilibrium
under both regimes.
83.1 Individual behavior
Since employment is chosen after the capital stock has been installed and the idiosyncratic shock
has been observed, optimal employment maximizes proﬁts state-by-state. Furthermore, by constant
returns to scale, optimal employment and proﬁts are linear in own capital. We therefore have that:
nijt =  njtkijt and dijt =  rjtkijtdt + jkijtdzijt ; (7)
where  njt =  n(!jt)  argmaxn[F(1;n)   !jtn] and  rjt =  r(!jt)  maxn [F(1;n)   !jtn]   : As in
Angeletos (2007), the key ﬁnding here is that households face linear, albeit risky, returns to their
capital. This linearity, together with the homotheticity of preferences, ensures that the household’s
consumption-saving problem reduces to a tractable homothetic optimization problem, much like in
Samuelson’s and Merton’s classic portfolio analysis. It then follows that the optimal policy rules
are linear in wealth, as shown in the next lemma.
Lemma 1. Let f!jt;Rjtgt2[0;1) be equilibrium price sequences (with R1t = R2t = Rt if the world is




t Rjd!jsds denote the present value of labor income (a.k.a. human
capital). Then, optimal consumption, investment and bond holdings are given by
cijt = mjt(xijt + hjt); kijt = jt(xijt + hjt); and bijt = (1   jt)(xijt + hjt)   hjt; (8)
where mjt denotes the marginal propensity to consume and jt the marginal propensity to invest in
private capital. The marginal propensity to consumer solves the following recursion:
_ mjt
mt
= mt + (   1)^ jt    ; (9)
where ^ jt  jt   1
22
jt~ 2
j denotes the risk-adjusted return to saving and jt  t rjt + (1   jt)Rt
the mean return to saving. Finally, the marginal propensity to invest is given by
jt =




Condition (8) establishes the linearity of optimal consumption, capital and bond holdings in
wealth. Condition (10) identiﬁes the propensity to invest in the risky asset as an increasing function
of the risk premium, t   rt   Rt, and a decreasing function of the amount of uninsurable risk,
~ j = (1   j). Finally, condition (9) is essentially the Euler condition: it describes the growth
rate of the marginal propensity to consume as a function of the anticipated path of risk-adjusted
returns to saving.8
8Note that higher risk-adjusted returns reduce the propensity to consume (i.e., increase the propensity to save) if
and only if the elasticity of intertemporal substitution  exceeds one; this is is due to the familiar tension between
the income and substitution eﬀects implied by an increase in the rate of return.
93.2 General equilibrium
Let f(K)  F(K;1) = K. From Proposition 1, we have that the equilibrium values of the
propensity to invest and the risk-adjusted return to saving are given by jt = (Kjt;Rt; ~ j) and
^ jt = ^ (Kjt;Rt; ~ j), where
(K;R; ~ ) 
(f0(K)      R)
~ 2 and ^ (K;R; ~ )  R +
(f0(K)      R)
2
2~ 2 :
Furthermore, the equilibrium wage satisﬁes !jt = f(Kjt) f0(Kjt)Kjt = (1 )f(Kjt): Using these
facts, aggregating the policy rules of the agents, and imposing market clearing for the risk-free bond,
we arrive at the following tractable characterization of the general equilibrium of the economy.
Proposition 1. In either the autarchic or the integrated equilibrium, the aggregate dynamics of
country j satisfy the following ODE system
Cjt + _ Kjt + _ Bjt = f (Kjt)   Kjt + RjtBjt (11)
_ Cjt
Cjt




_ Hjt = RjtHjt   (1   )f(Kjt) (13)
Bjt = (1   jt)(Kjt + Bjt)   jtHjt ; (14)
where jt = (Kjt;Rjt; ~ j) and ^ jt = ^ (KjtRjt; ~ j). The autarchic equilibrium is then obtained by
letting R1t 6= R2t and requiring that, for each j, Rjt adjusts so that
Bjt = 0 : (15)
In contrast, the integrated equilibrium is obtained by imposing R1t = R2t = Rt and requiring that
Rt adjusts so that
B1t + B2t = 0 : (16)
Conditions (11) and (12) give, respectively, the resource constraint and the aggregate Euler
condition. Condition (13) gives the law of motion for human capital, whereas condition (14) gives
the equilibrium level of aggregate holdings of the riskless bond or, equivalently, the net foreign
asset position of the country. Conditions (15) and (16) then complete the characterization of the
equilibrium: under ﬁnancial autarchy, the domestic interest rate of each country must be such that
the net foreign asset position of that country is zero; under ﬁnancial integration, the world-wide
interest rate must be such that the asset positions of the two countries balance one another.
At this point, it is important to recognize how idiosyncratic risk impacts the general-equilibrium
system. When ~ j = 0, arbitrage imposes that Rt = f0(Kjt)    = ^ jt, and the Euler condition
10reduces to its familiar complete-markets version,
_ Cjt
Cjt = (Rt   ). When instead ~ j > 0, there
are two important changes. First, the precautionary motive for saving introduces a positive drift
in consumption growth, represented by the term 1
2~ 2
j2
jt in the Euler condition (12). This is the
key force in Bewley-type models such as Aiyagari (1994) and Mendoza et al. (2008). Second, the
fact that investment is subject to undiversiﬁable idiosyncratic risk introduces a wedge between the
risk-free rate and the marginal product of capital, so that Rjt < ^ jt < f0(Kjt)   . This wedge
plays a crucial role in the results of our paper and distinguishes it from the aforementioned work.
4 Steady state
In this section we ﬁrst explain how long-run wealth accumulation impacts the wedge between the
interest rate and the marginal product of capital, and thereby the steady-state level of capital for
given interest rate. This identiﬁes the key mechanism behind the long-run eﬀects in our framework.
We then complete the characterization of the autarchic and integrated steady states by studying
the determination of the interest rate.
4.1 Long-run wealth accumulation and the wedge on investment
In steady state, whether under autarchy or under integration, the growth rate of aggregate con-
sumption in each country must be zero. The Euler condition (12) then reduces to the following:








This condition simply requires that the risk-adjusted return to saving in country j be lower than
the discount rate as much as it takes for the associated negative intertemporal substitution eﬀect to








where j = f0(Kj)      Rj is the risk premium, we can restate condition (17) as follows:
f0(Kj)    = Rj +
s
2~ 2
j (   Rj)
 + 1
: (18)
We infer that this condition pins down the combinations of the domestic capital stock and the
interest rate that are consistent with stationarity of aggregate consumption—equivalently, with
stationarity of aggregate wealth—in country j.
If there were no uninsurable idiosyncratic risk (~  = 0), condition (18) would have reduced to the
familiar condition f0(K)  = R; that is, the marginal product of capital would have been equated
to the interest rate. Furthermore, this would have implied that the capital stock is a decreasing
function of the interest rate. Now, instead, we have that the marginal product of capital exceeds
the interest rate: f0(K)    > R. This is because agents require a positive risk premium in order
11to be willing to hold their risky entrepreneurial capital. In addition, the steady-state value of this
premium, which is given by the square-root term in (18), is decreasing in the interest rate. This is
because a higher interest rate permits the domestic agents to accumulate more wealth in the long
run, which in turn increases their willingness to take risk and thereby reduces the wedge between
the interest rate and the marginal product of capital.9
Indeed, for any given initial level of aggregate wealth, a higher interest rate necessarily increases
the mean return to saving and therefore also increases the level of aggregate wealth in subsequent
periods. It follows that the long-run level of aggregate wealth also increases. The accumulation of
more wealth, in turn, increases agents’ willingness to take risk—due to diminishing absolute risk
aversion—and thereby reduces the premium they require in order to hold any given amount of
capital. Hence, the overall impact of the interest rate on capital accumulation is now ambiguous: a
higher interest rate may actually induce more investment in the long run, due to the wealth eﬀect
on risk taking. This wealth and risk-taking eﬀect plays a central role in the results of our paper;
we will revisit it shortly.
Going back to the determination of the steady state, we now note that, because the interest
rate and the wage are constant in steady state, the present value of labor income is also constant.
In particular, it is given by Hj = (1   )f(Kj)=Rj. Using this into condition (14), we infer









Combining this result with the one in condition (18), we reach the following lemma.
Lemma 2. (i) There exist continuous functions K;B : (0;)  R+ ! R such that, under either
autarchy or integration, the steady-state levels of aggregate capital and bond holdings satisfy
Kj = K(Rj; ~ j) and Bj = B(Rj; ~ j)Kj (20)
These functions are deﬁned by
K(R; ~ )  (f0) 1 (R + (R; ~ ) + ) and B(R; ~ ) 
1   (R; ~ )
(R; ~ )
 
(1   )f(K(R; ~ ))
RK(R; ~ )
;
where (R; ~ ) 
q
2~ 2
1+ (   R) and (R; ~ )  1
~ 2(R; ~ ) .
(ii)
@K(R;~ )
@R > 0 if and only if (R; ~ ) < 
1+; which in turn is true if and only if R > ^ R(~ ),
where ^ R(~ )     
1+
~ 2
2 <  R :
(iii)
@K(R;~ )
@~  < 0 necessarily.
9A similar mechanism—the impact of interest rates on wealth accumulation and thereby on entrepreneurial
investment—plays a central role in Goldberg (2010) and Moll (2010). These papers, however, focus is on how
wealth accumulation alleviates collateral/borrowing constraints, not risk-taking.
12(iv)
@B(R;~ )
@R > 0 necessarily.
(v)
@B(R;~ )
@~  > 0 if and only if R > R, where 0 < R  
2(1 )
+(2 ) <  R .
Part (i) follows from conditions (18) and (19). The functions K and B give, respectively, the
domestic capital stock and the net foreign-asset position that are consistent with stationarity of
aggregate wealth when the interest rate is R and the level of risk is ~ . These functions will turn
out to be particularly helpful in the characterization of the steady states.
Parts (ii) through (iv) then provide us with the comparative statics of these functions with
respect to the interest rate and the level of risk. Part (ii), in particular, establishes that the
steady-state capital stock is a U-shaped function of the interest rate. What lies behind this U-
shaped relation is our wealth-and-risk-taking eﬀect: for suﬃciently high R, this eﬀect dominates
the familiar opportunity-cost eﬀect, guaranteeing that a higher interest rate increases the capital
stock in the steady state. This result plays a crucial role in our subsequent analysis. Part (iv), then,
complements this result by showing that, as the interest rate increases, the propensity to save in
the bond also increases: as the risk-free rate increases, saving in the riskless asset (bond) increases
relative to aggregate saving in the risky asset (capital).
Finally, parts (iii) and (v) establish that, for any given interest rate, an increase in the level
of risk necessarily reduces the steady-state capital stock, while it increases the propensity to save
in the bond as long as the interest-rate is not too low. These properties capture, respectively, the
risk-aversion and precautionary-saving eﬀects of higher idiosyncratic risk.
Combined, these results facilitate the characterization of the autarchic and integrated steady
states. To sharpen this characterization, we now introduce the following assumption, which we will
invoke for a subset of our results.

















j ) is the autarchic steady-state saving rate of country j.
This assumption requires either (i) that the uninsurable idiosyncratic risk exceeds some minimal
level, or (ii) that the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, , is suﬃciently high relative to saving
rates. It can be shown that the former property implies the latter (see appendix). The advantage of
the former property is that it is stated in terms of purely exogenous parameters, thus guaranteeing
the existence of economies for which the assumption holds. The advantage of the latter property is
that it can easily be mapped to data.
In particular, consider the following back-of-the-envelope exercise. Using US data, we can set
  :36 and saut  :23. It then follows that Assumption 1 is satisﬁed for the United States if  > :2.
13For countries with higher saving rates, this condition might be satisﬁed for even lower values of .
Since most recent estimates of  are almost always above :5, and often above 1, we conclude that
Assumption 1 is a very plausible benchmark.
In any event, the role of this assumption is to guarantee that the autarchic steady states lie
in the increasing portion of the function K. In words, this means that, in the neighborhood of
the autarchic steady state, the wealth-and-risk-taking eﬀect of a higher interest rate dominates the
standard opportunity-cost eﬀect.
4.2 Autarchy
We are now ready to provide our ﬁrst main result, which concerns the characterization of the
autarchic steady state.
Proposition 2. There always exists an autarchic steady state, it is unique, and it features the
following properties:
(i) The autarchic interest rates are given by Raut
j , where Raut
j solves B(Raut
j ; ~ j) = 0; and satisfy
R < Raut
2 < Raut
1 <  R ;
where  R is the complete-markets interest rate,  R = .
(ii) The autarchic capital stocks are given by Kaut
j = K(Raut




1 <  K ;
where  K is the complete-markets capital stock, deﬁned by f0(  K) =  + .
(iii) The autarchic consumption levels are given by Caut
j = f(Kaut
j ) Kaut




1 <  C;
where  C is the complete-markets consumption level, deﬁned by  C = f(  K)     K :
The existence and the uniqueness of the autarchic steady state follow from the continuity and
monotonicity of the function B with respect to R (which we established in Lemma 2), along with
appropriate limit properties (which we establish in the appendix).
Part (i) characterizes the steady-state levels of the interest rate: it establishes that the interest
rate is lower than the discount rate in both countries, and more so in the South than in the North.
The ﬁrst property, namely that the autarchic interest rates are lower than the discount rate, reﬂects
the presence of a precautionary motive for saving. As noted earlier, this is similar to Aiyagari (1994)
and Mendoza et al. (2008). The second property, that the interest rate in the South is lower than the
one in the North, is then a consequence of the fact that the precautionary motive is stronger in the
14South, due to the higher level of idiosyncratic risk. Formally, this is captured by the monotonicity
of the function B with respect to ~ : the higher the level of undiversiﬁable idiosyncratic risk, the
higher the steady-state demand for the risk-free asset for any given R; but since the net supply of
this asset is zero when the economy is in autarchy, it must be that the autarchic interest rate is
lower the higher is ~ .
This result is also illustrated in Figure 1. The interest rate is on the horizontal axis. The solid
line is the curve B for the North; the dashed line is the curve B for the South. These curves can be
interpreted as the aggregate demand for the safe asset in each country (normalized, though, by the
corresponding capital stocks). Both curves are increasing in R, but the one for the South lies above
the one for the North, reﬂecting the stronger precautionary motive in the South. The autarchic
steady-state interest rates are given by the intersections of the two curves with the horizontal zero
line. Clearly, the South has a lower autarchic interest rate, Raut
2 < Raut
1 .
Part (ii) characterizes the steady-state levels of the capital stock: it establishes, under Assump-
tion 1, that the capital stock is lower than its complete-markets counterpart in both countries, and
more so in the South than in the North. The ﬁrst property, namely that the autarchic capital stocks
are lower than their complete-markets counterparts, revisits the key result in Angeletos (2006). As
mentioned in the introduction, this is a core prediction that diﬀerentiates our framework from prior
work, including Aiyagari (1994), Krusell and Smith (1998), Mendoza et al. (2008, 2009), and most
other Bewley-type models where incomplete risk sharing is typically associated with higher capital
accumulation. Furthermore, this prediction is obviously more consistent with the data than the
alternative featured in the aforementioned class of models: our framework predicts that the least
ﬁnancially developed countries are the poorest ones, not the richest ones.
The key for this diﬀerence is the type of risk featured in those models versus the type of risk in
our model. In those models, agents face only idiosyncratic labor-income risk. This risk introduces
a precautionary motive for saving, which reduces the interest rate, but does not break the equality
between the interest rate and the marginal product of capital. In contrast, our model features
entrepreneurial, or capital-income, risk. This risk introduces not only a precautionary motive, but
also a positive wedge between the interest rate and the marginal product of capital; this wedge is
the risk premium on private investment. It follows that, while incomplete risk-sharing necessarily
encourages more capital accumulation in Bewley models by reducing the interest rate, it can dis-
courage capital accumulation in our model by introducing the risk-premium wedge. The conditions
in Assumption 1 then suﬃce for this wedge to dominate the reduction in the interest rate, thus
guaranteeing that the capital stock is lower than under complete markets. Finally, the result that
the autarchic capital stock is lower in the South than in the North reﬂects the fact that the wedge
is higher in the South. Formally, this last result follows combining the facts that ~  is higher in the
South, that R is lower in the South, that the function K is necessarily decreasing in ~ , and that,
under Assumption 1, this function is also increasing in R for all R  Raut
j .
15Finally, part (iii) characterizes the steady-state level of consumption: it establishes, under As-
sumption 1, that the aggregate level of consumption is lower than its complete-markets counterpart
in both countries, and more so in the South than in the North.
Combined, the above results show that, under autarchy, the South—the economy with more
severe ﬁnancial frictions—features a lower risk-free rate, a higher marginal product of capital, and
lower levels of aggregate capital, wealth and consumption.
4.3 Financial integration
We now proceed to our second main result, the characterization of the integrated steady state.
Proposition 3. An integrated steady state exists, and it necessarily features the following properties:
(i) The interest rate is given by Rint, where Rint solves
P
j2f1;2g B(Rint; ~ j)K(Rint; ~ j) = 0,
and satisﬁes
Raut
2 < Rint < Raut
1 <  :
(ii) The foreign asset positions are given by Bint
j = B(Rint; ~ j)Kint
j and satisfy
Bint
1 < 0 < Bint
2 :
(iii) The capital stocks are given by Kint

















Part (i) establishes that the interest rate in the integrated steady state falls between the two
autarchic values, while part (ii) states that in the integrated steady state the South is a net creditor,
while the North is a net debtor. As we will see in the next section, this steady-state position is
attained after a long transition throughout which the North runs persistent current-account deﬁcits
(and, symmetrically, the South runs persistent current-account surpluses).
These two results contain the explanation that our model oﬀers for global imbalances:
Corollary 1. Along the transition from the autarchic to the integrated steady state, the North must
accumulate a negative foreign asset position, that is, it must run a series of current-account deﬁcits.
Intuitively, this is because the North has a comparative advantage in supplying the riskless asset.
More precisely, the autarchic price of the riskless asset is lower (i.e., the autarchic interest rate is
higher) in the North than in the South because of the weaker precautionary motive in the North.
16Extrapolating from standard trade theory, one would thus expect that the North will become a net
supplier of the riskless asset once the two countries are allowed to trade. Of course, this intuition
could have been misleading both because we are talking here about capital ﬂaws, not goods trade,
and because of the rich dynamics that are involved in our environment. Nevertheless, our results
show that this basic intuition is largely correct.
Parts (iii) and (iv) then study the long-run implications of ﬁnancial integration for economic
activity and world-wide inequality. In particular, part (iii) establishes that the South has a higher
capital stock in the integrated steady state than in the autarchic one. Formally, this is a direct
implication of our earlier result in Lemma 2 that the function K is increasing in R. More intuitively,
this is because of the dynamics of wealth accumulation that we highlighted earlier: agents in the
South enjoy a higher capital stock in the integrated steady state because a prolonged access to higher
safe returns permits them to accumulate more wealth, and therefore to take more risk. The converse
is true for the North. Finally, part (iv) spells out the implications for aggregate consumption. The
South enjoys a higher level of consumption in the integrated steady state than under autarchy, both
because it has accumulated more capital domestically and because it has accumulated a positive
position against the North. Once again, the converse is true for the North.
Clearly, similar properties as those for capital and consumption hold if we look at GDP, wages,
and labor productivity. This gives the key prediction of our model regarding the long-run impact
of ﬁnancial integration on cross-country inequality:
Corollary 2. In the long run, ﬁnancial integration reduces cross-country inequality.
As we will see next, however, the short-run eﬀects are quite diﬀerent.
5 Transitional dynamics and numerical example
In this section we examine in more detail the dynamic responses of the two countries to the inte-
gration of their ﬁnancial markets, starting from an initial position that coincides with the autarchic
steady states. For this purpose, we henceforth have to abandon generality and focus on a particular
numerical exercise. While we base this numerical exercise on a somewhat plausible calibration of
the model, we invite the reader not to focus on the precise numbers: the simplicity of our model and
data limitations preclude a rich, serious quantitative assessment. That being said, the numerical
exercise indicates that the eﬀects can be of non-trivial magnitude. Furthermore, the qualitative
patterns we identify with this particular numerical exercise are extremely robust: as one should
anticipate from our earlier theoretical results, they obtain for a wide range of parameters that we
have experimented with as long as Assumption 1 is maintained.
175.1 Parameterization
The two economies are parameterized by (; ; ; ; ; ~ 1; ~ 2), where  is the income share of
capital,  is the discount rate,  is the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion,  is the depreciation rate,
 is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, and ~ j is the undiversiﬁable risk in country j.
The time period is interpreted as one year. All the preference and technology parameters
are set in a manner that is broadly consistent with the macro and macro-ﬁnance literatures. In
particular, the discount rate is  = 0:05. The elasticity of intertemporal substitution is  = 1, a
value broadly consistent with recent micro and macro estimates.10 The coeﬃcient of relative risk
aversion is  = 8, a value commonly used in the macro-ﬁnance literature to help generate plausible
risk premia. Finally, the depreciation rate is  = 0:10, and the share of capital in production is
 = 0:40.
This leaves us with ~ j or, equivalently, with j and j. We ﬁrst focus on j, which we interpret
as the idiosyncratic volatility of the rate of return that an individual entrepreneur faces in his
investment, regardless of whether this risk is insurable or not. This interpretation is analogous to
the notion of idiosyncratic volatility for stock market returns, except that here we are primarily
interested in privately-held businesses.11
Unfortunately, there is no direct measure for  in the US economy because of the unavailability
of suﬃciently rich data about entrepreneurial returns. However, there are various indications that
idiosyncratic investment risks in the United States are signiﬁcant. For instance, the probability that
a privately held ﬁrm survives ﬁve years after entry is less than 40%. Furthermore, even conditional
on survival, the risks faced by entrepreneurs and private investors appear to be very large: as
Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002) document, not only is there a dramatic cross-sectional
variation in the returns to private equity, but also the volatility of the book value of an index of
private ﬁrms is twice as large as that of the index of public ﬁrms. Since this index already diversiﬁes
the ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk in private equity, and since the volatility of the entire pool of public ﬁrms is
about 15% per annum, this gives another indication of the signiﬁcant risks faced by entrepreneurs.
Finally, if one takes the idiosyncratic volatility of public ﬁrms as a proxy for that of private ﬁrms,
this would suggest a value of  over 50% for the United States. This is actually the value preferred
by Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002), Bitler et al. (2005) and Roussanov (2009).
Another indirect estimate for the private-sector volatility in the US could be motivated by the
work of Davis et al. (2006), who use the Longitudinal Business Database (LBD). They ﬁnd that in
2001 the ratio of private to public volatility of employment growth rates was in the range of 1.43-
1.75. Given that the average annual standard deviation of returns for public ﬁrms over 1990-1997
10See Angeletos (2007) for a more thorough discussion of the relevance of this parameter within the type of model
we have employed here, and also for references on the empirical estimates of this parameter.
11Note, though, that idiosyncratic risk may aﬀect the investment decisions of publicly traded ﬁrms as well. See
Panousi and Papanikolaou (2010) for evidence.
18was 0.11 according to Campbell et al. (2001), and that there is, at least in the context of the present
model, a close relationship between the volatility of proﬁts and the volatility of labor demand, a
choice of  near 0.20 for the US economy could be justiﬁed from this perspective. Finally, if one
also takes into account that, in the data, sales and proﬁts are more volatile than employment (at
least for public ﬁrms), this would suggest even higher values for .
Combining the above observations, and interpreting the North in our model as the United States,
we conclude that a value for 1 near 0:5 is a plausible benchmark. However, as already mentioned,
the entrepreneur may be able to diversify away a fraction  of that risk, so that the volatility of
the remaining undiversiﬁable risk is in fact lower than . Furthermore, our model assumes that all
capital is held in private businesses, whereas in reality an important fraction is held in publicly-
traded companies. For these reasons, we next proceed to discuss the value of  and/or ~ .
Although we have not explicitly modelled the distinction between private and public equity,
the following conceptual exercise provides a possible mapping between our model and the data.12
Suppose that each household in our model is able to split its family business in two accounting
identities. The one, which takes a fraction  of the business’s output and proﬁts, “goes public”:
it is sold in the market for its expected value, so that the household diversiﬁes the risk in that
component. The other, which takes the residual (1   ) of the business’s output and proﬁts, “stays
private”: the household has to bear the risk in that component. This interpretation then suggests
that  can be matched to the ratio of public ﬁrm proﬁts over total proﬁts in the United States, where
total proﬁts are the sum of privately held ﬁrm proﬁts plus corporate proﬁts. In the National Income
and Product Accounts (NIPAs), the ratio of proprietors’ proﬁts over total proﬁts (proprietors plus
corporate) is 47% on average over the period 1981-2006. This gives a value for 1 around 0:5 or 0:6,
which is consistent with other estimates of the size of public equity relative to total capital.13
Finally, a direct calibration of the uninsurable risk ~ 1 can be obtained as follows. In our model,
the idiosyncratic volatility of individual consumption growth is proportional to ~ 1. We could then
ask what is the value of ~ 1 that makes our model’s prediction about idiosyncratic consumption
volatility match the one found in the data. Using studies that estimate this idiosyncratic variance
of consumption growth in US data, such as Ait-Sahalia et al. (2001) and Malloy et al. (2006), we
then infer that the appropriate value for ~ 1 is close to 0:2. On the basis of this observation and
the preceding discussion, we pick 1 = 0:5, 1 = 0:6 and ~ 1  (1   1)1 = 0:2 as our favorable
parameterization for the North.
Turning to the South, we note that data on entrepreneurial activity and idiosyncratic investment
risk are even more scarce in developing countries than in the United States. Nevertheless, there are
multiple indications that idiosyncratic risk is higher in developing countries. For lack of a better
12Incidentally, note that the distinction between private and public equity is unclear in the data too, since ownership
of many public companies is often concentrated in the hands of few key investors.
13See Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002) for a more extensive discussion of the relative size of private and
public equity in the United States.
19Baseline parameter values
Preferences and technologies Risk: North Risk: South
Parameter      1 1 ~ 1 2 2 ~ 2
Value 0.05 1 8 0.40 0.10 0.50 0.60 0.20 0.50 0.20 0.40
Table 1: Baseline parameter values.
alternative, we assume that the overall amount of risk 2 in the South is the same as the one
assumed for the North. We then set 2 at the conservative value of 0:2. This is at the upper range
of available estimates of the ratio of public equity to total capital in less advanced economies such
as China, India, Brazil and Mexico (e.g., Demirguc and Levine, 1996; La Porta et al., 1997). This
approach gives 2 = 0:5, 2 = 0:2 and ~ 2  (1   1)1 = 0:4 as our favorable parameterization for
the South.
In any event, what matters for the qualitative properties of all the results we document below
is merely the fact that ~ 2 is higher than ~ 1, not the precise numbers we have picked. With this
qualiﬁcation in mind, we summarize the baseline parameterization of our model in Table 1 and
proceed to document the dynamic eﬀects of ﬁnancial integration.
5.2 Dynamic responses
We are now ready to conduct the experiment of interest, namely a reform that lets the two economies
integrate their ﬁnancial markets (i.e., to trade the riskless asset). This reform is assumed to be
unexpected and irreversible. Before this reform, the two economies are assumed to rest at their
respective autarchic steady states. The objective is then to study the dynamics responses of these
economies to this reform.
Tracking the transitional dynamics of incomplete-market models is often a daunting exercise.
This is not the case here, thanks to the low dimensionality of the general-equilibrium system of
our model. In particular, note from Lemma 1 that, when  = 1, the marginal propensity to
consume out of total wealth reduces to mjt =  for all j;t. It then follows from Proposition 1
that the transitional dynamics of the world economy can be reduced to a simple system of four
ﬁrst-order ODE’s in (Xjt;Hjt)j2f1;2g, where Xjt  Kjt +Bjt. Our numerical algorithm then works
as follows. First, we solve for both the autarchic and the integrated steady-state aggregates. Next,
we numerically solve the aforementioned ODE system using the autarchic steady-state values of
capital, Xj0  Kaut
j , as initial conditions and the integrated steady-state values of human wealth,
Hint
j , as terminal conditions.
The dynamic path of the South is illustrated in Figure 2, and that of the North in Figure 3.
Time in years is on the horizontal axis, and levels of several macroeconomic variables are on the
vertical axis. The dotted lines indicate the levels of the variables at the autarchic steady state. The
20dashed lines indicate the levels of the variables at the integrated steady state. The solid lines show
the dynamic responses of the variables.
Figure 2 shows that, immediately upon integration, the capital stock in the South falls below its
autarchic steady-state level. But after this initial fall, the capital stock starts recovering. In fact,
it is back to the autarchy level in about thirty years and it keeps increasing after that, eventually
converging to the new, higher, integrated steady state. In other words, the South faces a bleak
picture in the short run, with a signiﬁcant outﬂow of capital immediately after integration, but this
picture is reversed in the long run, as capital starts ﬂying back into the country, eventually reaching
a higher level than under autarchy. In particular, the capital stock in the South falls by almost
4% immediately after integration, compared to its autarchic steady state. But, at the long-run
integrated steady state, the capital stock in the South has increased almost 9% above its autarchic
level. The same qualitative picture is true for the other aggregate variables, such as aggregate
output, consumption, and the wage. For example, aggregate output in the South falls by almost
2% in the short run, and it increases by almost 3% in the long run, compared to its autarchic value.
Figure 3 demonstrates the exact opposite picture for the North. Immediately upon integration,
the North experiences an inﬂow of capital, and capital remains above its autarchic level for about
ﬁfty years. However, in the long run, capital settles at an integrated level lower than the autarchic
one. The same is true for the other aggregate variables. The interest rate jumps down from the
autarchic steady state upon integration, and it settles at an even lower level in the long run. Finally,
in the long run the North ends up borrowing from the South. In other words, the North experiences
an initial period of prosperity, but in the long run this picture is reversed. For example, capital
in the North increases by about 2:5% upon integration, but it falls by about 5% in the long-run
steady state, compared to its autarchy level. And aggregate output in the North increases by 1%
upon integration, but it falls by 2% in the long run, compared to autarchy.
The intuition behind these results is as follows. While in autarchy, the South faces higher levels
of idiosyncratic risk and therefore features a higher demand for precautionary saving than the North.
This stronger precautionary motive keeps the domestic (risk-free) interest rate suppressed in the
South relative to the North. Upon integration, however, the precautionary saving of the South is
partly absorbed by the North, implying that the domestic interest rate has to increase in the South
(and decrease in the North). This in turn has very diﬀerent implications for the macroeconomic
outcomes of the South depending on whether we look at the short run or the long run. In the short
run, the increase in the interest rate means an increase in the opportunity cost of capital, causing
a reduction in the capital stock of the South. In the long run, however, this increase in the interest
rate permits the residents of the South to accumulate more wealth. As they do so, they become
willing to undertake more investment risk, which explains why the capital stock recovers over time.
The fact that the capital stock eventually increases beyond its autarchic value then follows from
Proposition 3.
21Finally, note that, along the transition to the new steady state, the South runs signiﬁcant
current-account surpluses, so that it keeps increasing its ﬁnancial position abroad. Conversely, the
North runs signiﬁcant current-account deﬁcits, eventually reaching a dramatic level of foreign debt,
equal to about 3.5 times its GDP. Clearly, this is the manifestation of the precautionary saving of
the South rushing for safety in the North.
Our ﬁndings thus provide a novel perspective on the ongoing debate on the costs and beneﬁts
of capital-market liberalization. In particular, while many fear that such a reform may cause an
outﬂow of capital, and while this fear seems to be validated by the recent emergence of global
imbalances, here we ﬁnd that this eﬀect may be reversed in the long run thanks to the endogenous
accumulation of capital.
Corollary 3. Financial integration can trigger an outﬂow of capital from the poor country in the
short run, thereby exacerbating cross-country inequality. These eﬀects, however, are reversed in the
long run.
6 Welfare implications
In this section we examine the welfare eﬀects of integration within each country. In so doing, we
are interested in distinguishing how these eﬀects may vary between the poor and the rich, as well as
across diﬀerent generations.14 This motivates us to consider two exercises. The ﬁrst studies welfare
at the moment the reform takes place, taking into account the entire transitional dynamics that
will follow, i.e. it examines the welfare eﬀects of integration for the generations currently alive at
the time of the reform. The second compares welfare across the autarchic and the integrated steady
states, i.e. it captures the welfare eﬀects of integration for future generations (those who will be
alive at the new integrated-world steady state).
More precisely, the ﬁrst exercise seeks to answer the following question. Suppose that a country
rests in its autarchic steady state and the current generation contemplates the option to undertake
a reform that would let it integrate with the other country. Pick a particular level of wealth. What
is the minimal compensation an agent with that particular level of wealth would be willing to
accept in return for the failure of the reform to take place? The second exercise seeks to answer
14At this point, we note that our baseline model features an explosive level of wealth inequality within each country.
This is because individual dynamics follow a random walk in steady state and agents leave for ever. To ﬁx this issue,
we modify the model to let the agents die with a constant Poisson rate v > 0 and get replaced with other agents who
“inherit” the average level of wealth. We can then adjust the subjective discount rate so that the eﬀective discount
rate, which now includes v, remains the same as in our baseline model. This guarantees that the aggregate dynamics
of the modiﬁed model remain exactly the same as those of our baseline model, while at the same time the modiﬁed
model admits a unique, well-deﬁned steady-state wealth distribution. The appendix provides the basic details of the
modiﬁed model, and Panousi (2010) provides all the details on this approach. For our numerical exercise, we set
v = 1=150; this is motivated by the fact that the average mortality rate is about 1=75 per year and the fact that
agents are imperfectly altruistic towards future generations.
22the following question. Suppose that future generations are oﬀered the option to be born in the
autarchic steady state versus be born in the integrated steady state. Fix a particular ranking in
the wealth distribution (say, the 7-th percentile). What is the minimal compensation an agent with
that particular ranking would have to receive under the autarchic steady state in order to be as
happy as an agent with the same ranking under the integrated steady state? In short, the ﬁrst
exercise studies how ﬁnancial integration impacts the welfare of the poor and the rich in the current
generation, while the second exercise studies how it impacts the welfare of the poor and the rich of
future generations.






1;int(x) denote the value functions
at, respectively, the autarchic steady state, the time the reform initiates, and the integrated steady
state. The ﬁrst welfare exercise is to compute, for each level of ﬁnancial wealth x, a compensating
diﬀerential j(x) such that V
j
1;aut(x + j(x)) = V
j
0;int(x). The second exercise is to compute a
compensating diﬀerential 0





1;int(gj(x)), where gj(x) is the level
of wealth that corresponds to the same relative wealth position under the integrated steady state as
the one obtained with wealth x under the autarchic steady state. For either of these two exercises,
we then express the corresponding compensating diﬀerential as a fraction of the agent’s permanent
income.15 The resulting number represents a welfare gain if it is positive, and a welfare loss if it is
negative.
These welfare gains and losses are then illustrated in Table 2 and in Figure 4, for each of the
two countries and for diﬀerent levels of wealth. Table 2 summarizes the welfare gains and losses
across the four quartiles of the autarchic steady-state wealth distribution. Figure 4 gives a similar
but ﬁner picture, by illustrating the welfare eﬀects across all percentiles of the wealth distribution.
The solid line in this ﬁgure represents the welfare eﬀects for the current generation (that is, those
obtained by the ﬁrst of the aforementioned welfare exercises), while the dashed line represents the
welfare eﬀects for future generations (that is, those obtained by the second exercise).
We ﬁrst consider the South, which is in panel (a) of Figure 4. On impact (solid line), ﬁnancial
integration beneﬁts the rich at the expense of the poor: the currently-poor suﬀer losses, whereas
the currently-rich enjoy gains. However, in future generations (dashed line), the eﬀects for these
income groups are reversed: the poor of the future are better oﬀ living under integration than under
autarchy, while the converse is true for the rich of the future. For example, as shown in Table 2,
agents at the bottom quartile of the wealth distribution in the current generation suﬀer an average
loss equal to 8:4% of their permanent income upon integration, while agents at the bottom quartile
of the wealth distribution in future generations enjoy an average gain of 3:8% from integration. The
corresponding numbers for those agents at the top quartile of the wealth distribution are a gain of
15That is, a number equal to, say, 5% means that the agent must receive either a lump sum equal to 5% of his
eﬀective wealth or, equivalently, a perpetuity with annual dividend equal to 5% of his permanent income.
23Baseline welfare eﬀects
South North
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Current generation
(at time of reform)
 8:4  2:8  1:1 0:9 3:3 1:2 0:5  0:7
Future generations
(across steady states)
3:8 3:8 1:8  0:8  11:6  3:0 0:8 6:8
Table 2: Baseline welfare eﬀects. This table summarizes the welfare eﬀects of ﬁnancial inte-
gration across the quartiles of the wealth distribution. Q1 is the ﬁrst quartile, Q2 is the second
quartile, and so on. The numbers is the cells of the table report the within-quartile averages of the
compensating diﬀerentials for the current generation (at the moment integration takes place) and
for future generations (compares welfare across the autarchic and integrated steady states). The
compensating diﬀerentials are measured as percent of permanent income.
0:9% for the current generation and a loss of 0:8% for the future generation, respectively.16
The intuition behind these results is as follows. On impact, ﬁnancial integration causes the
South’s wages to fall and its interest rates to rise, as we have seen in Figure 2. Both these forces tend
to reduce the present discounted value of wages, that is, the human wealth of households. In turn,
this hurts all agents, but more so the poorer ones, since a larger fraction of poor agents’ eﬀective
wealth comes from labor income. At the same time, the reduction in wages means that private
businesses now face lower labor costs, which increases the average return on private investment.
Along with the fact that the interest rate has also increased, this means that the overall return
to saving has increased. This eﬀect tends to beneﬁt the rich, who have large amounts of ﬁnancial
wealth relative to human wealth. In our example, this positive eﬀect is strong enough to oﬀset the
negative eﬀect of the reduced human wealth for richer agents, and it explains why richer agents gain
whereas poorer agents lose from integration on the impact of the reform.
At the new integrated steady state, on the other hand, wages in the South eventually settle
at a higher level than under autarchy. This tends to increase human wealth. The increase in the
interest rate contributes in the opposite direction, but it does not oﬀset the positive eﬀect of higher
wages. The resulting increase in human wealth then beneﬁts both the poor and the rich of future
generations. Along with the fact that the wealth distribution shifts to the right, this explains why
the future-poor (and middle classes) are the most likely to beneﬁt from integration. The future-rich,
however, may end up losing because the new steady state is associated with higher labor costs and
lower mean returns to entrepreneurship, compared to autarchy.
We next consider the North, which is illustrated in panel (b) of Figure 4. On impact (solid line),
the poor and the middle classes of the current generation gain, while the very rich lose. Once again,
16We note here that, compared to its autarchic level, GDP in the South falls by 1.6% on the impact of the reform,
while it increases by 3.3% at the integrated steady state. The eﬀects of integration on GDP for both countries are
presented in Table 5, which is delegated to the appendix to economize in space.
24Sensitivity analysis for the South
Current generation Future generations
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
baseline  8:4  2:8  1:1 0:9 3:8 3:8 1:8  0:8
~ 2 = 0:6  18:3  5:0  1:8 1:9 5:2 5:8 2:6  1:7
 = 0:7  14:0  12:0  10:8  8:4 53:3 0:6 0:7 2:2
~ 2 = 0:6; = 0:7  25:9  19:6  16:2  10:3 65:2 2:5 2:4 2:3
~ 2 : 0:4 ! 0:2 23:9 16:1 15:9 15:6 40:2 30:0 22:9 13:9
Table 3: Sensitivity analysis for the South. This table revisits the welfare eﬀects of ﬁnancial
integration for the South, for three alternative parameterizations and a variant policy reform.
future generations face reversed eﬀects (dashed line): the poor lose and the rich gain. For example,
as shown in Table 2, the agents currently at the bottom quartile of the wealth distribution gain
3:3%, while those at the bottom quartile of the distribution in the future lose 11:6%. The agents
at the top quartile of the distribution in the current generation lose 0:7%, while those at the top
quartile in future generations gain 6:8%. The intuition for these results is analogous to that for the
South. Immediately upon integration, the current-generation poor in the North gain because of the
increase in human wealth, whereas the current-generation rich lose because of the lower return to
their bond holdings and the higher labor costs in their private businesses. But as time passes and
capital starts decreasing, the consequent reduction in wages hurts the poor and beneﬁts the rich of
future generations.17
In what follows we examine the sensitivity of our ﬁndings to three variant parameterizations of
the model. In addition, we also consider an alternative policy exercise. The results are presented
in Table 3 for the South and in Table 4 for the North. In each table, the ﬁrst block presents the
welfare eﬀects for the current generation, and the second block presents the welfare eﬀects for future
generations. The ﬁrst line repeats the baseline welfare eﬀects from Table 2. The next three lines
present the three variant parameterizations. The last line presents the alternative reform exercise.
The ﬁrst variant we consider raises the level of uninsurable risk in the South, from ~ 2 = 0:4 to
~ 2 = 0:6. The second variant raises the income share of capital in both countries from  = 0:4 to
 = 0:7; this is meant to capture the broader deﬁnition of capital one may wish to use for long-run
considerations. The third variant combines the aforementioned two variants. Finally, we return
to the baseline parameterization but consider an alternative policy exercise: we now assume that
ﬁnancial integration permits the South to obtain access, not only to the higher safe returns of the
North, but also to the improved risk-sharing opportunities of the latter. That is, we let ﬁnancial
integration be associated with an increase of 2 from 0:2 to 0:6, and hence with a reduction in ~ 2
from 0:4 to 0:2.
17Compared to its autarchic level, GDP in the North increases by 1.1% on the impact of the reform, while it falls
by 2% at the integrated steady state.
25Sensitivity analysis for the North
Current generation Future generations
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
baseline 3:3 1:2 0:5  0:7  11:6  3:0 0:8 6:8
~ 2 = 0:6 4:5 1:8 0:8  0:8  15:3  3:6 1:2 9:3
 = 0:7 4:7 4:4 4:2 3:8  16:1 0:5 0:6 6:8
~ 2 = 0:6; = 0:7 3:6 3:4 3:3 3:0  15:2 0:3 0:5 7:1
~ 2 : 0:4 ! 0:2 0:0 0:0 0:0 0:0 0:0 0:0 0:0 0:0
Table 4: Sensitivity analysis for the North. This table revisits the welfare eﬀects of ﬁnancial
integration for the North, for three alternative parameterizations and a variant policy reform.
Under any of the three variant parameterizations, upon integration the very poor of the current
generation continue to suﬀer losses in the South and to enjoy beneﬁts in the North, as was the
case in the baseline. Notably though, the losses from integration in the South are now much more
widespread across agents at all wealth levels, and these losses become rather large in the second and
third variant parameterizations. Turning to future generations, the very poor continue to gain in the
South and to lose in the North, though the poor’s gains in the South now tend to be much bigger
than under the baseline, while the poor’s losses in the North are not much diﬀerent. Although,
compared to the baseline, future-generation beneﬁts become more widespread in the South, with
all quartiles actually gaining in the last two variants, nonetheless the beneﬁts from integration are
primarily enjoyed by agents in the bottom quartile. In other words, compared to the baseline,
integration for the South results in more widespread losses for the current generation, and in more
widespread beneﬁts, which however also exhibit a very high concentration at the bottom, for future
generations. These ﬁndings suggest that the welfare gains of capital-account liberalization for the
very poor of future generations are likely to be highest for economies where idiosyncratic risk impacts
a broad range of entrepreneurial, investment, and human-capital choices.
In the last exercise, agents in the South now gain at all wealth levels, both in the current
generation and in future ones. In addition, these welfare gains are now much bigger than in the
baseline policy exercise, and they are also more widespread in the population. For example, agents
in the bottom quartile in the current generation now gain 23:9% (instead of losing 8:4%, as in the
benchmark), and agents in the bottom quartile in future generations gain 40:2% (instead of 3:8%).
Agents in the top quartile in the current generation gain 15:6% (instead of 0:9%), and agents in the
top quartile in future generations gain 13:9% (instead of losing 0:8%). These ﬁndings indicate that
the beneﬁts of capital-account liberalization for the future generations of developing economies are
likely to be maximal if the reform also helps these countries alleviate their own agency, enforcement
and institutional problems by gaining access to the more eﬃcient ﬁnancial institutions of developed
economies.
26The numerical ﬁndings we have reported in this section are, of course, only illustrative. A serious
quantitative exercise would require a richer model, one that would allow for more sources of hetero-
geneity (e.g., diﬀerent levels of entrepreneurial ability), for diminishing returns in entrepreneurial
investment, and for endogenous occupational and educational choices. Nevertheless, the qualita-
tive properties we have uncovered are likely to be robust and they highlight the distinct eﬀects for
current versus future periods that are at the focus of our analysis.
7 TFP growth and shortage of assets
In this section we discuss an extension of our model that helps accommodate the idea that developing
countries suﬀer from a shortage of assets (Caballero, Farhi and Gourinchas, 2008), uncovers the
possible implications of our analysis for TFP growth, and helps resolve the puzzle that capital often
ﬂows from fast-growing to slow-growing countries (Gourinchas and Jeanne, 2008).
This extension introduces a “safe sector”. The technology in this sector has a lower mean return
than entrepreneurial activity, but entails no risk. One can think of this as, say, “farming”, or as some
form of storage technology. The broader idea here is that entrepreneurs face a trade-oﬀ between risk
and return as they choose among an array of investment opportunities—a trade-oﬀ that is known
to play a crucial role in aggregate TFP and growth dynamics (e.g., Acemoglu and Zillibotti, 1997).
The production function in the “safe sector” is assumed to take the form gj(Mjt) = AjM
jt, where
Mjt is the corresponding level of capital and Aj is a productivity parameter that determines the
size of the safe sector relative to that of the risky, entrepreneurial sector.18 Clearly, the equilibrium
must now satisfy Rjt = g0
j(Mjt) for each country j and all periods t: the marginal product of
capital in the safe sector is equated to the interest rate. This pins down the capital stock of the
safe sector—which can be interpreted as the supply of safe assets—as an increasing function of the
interest rate. The rest of the equilibrium characterization then proceeds in similar lines as in our
benchmark model, and is omitted here because of space limitations.
Consider now the following exercise. Restrict ~ 1 = ~ 2 but let 0 < A2 < A1. Letting A1 > A2
captures the idea that the North may have a technological or institutional superiority in supplying
the safe asset; restricting ~ 1 = ~ 2 seeks to isolate this possibility from the possibility of diﬀerential
levels of uninsurable entrepreneurial risk, the implications of which we have already studied. It is
then possible to check that all our ﬁndings continue to hold as before. In particular, the South
is poorer than the North under both autarchy and integration; the North runs persistent current-
account deﬁcits upon integration; capital initially ﬂies out of the South and into the North in the
short run; and ﬁnally this eﬀect is reversed in the long run.
This extension thus oﬀers a direct re-interpretation of the preceding analysis: our results origi-
nate interchangeably in the relatively higher level of uninsurable risk faced by entrepreneurs in the
18That the safe sector does not employ labor is for simplicity.
27South and/or in the relative superiority of the North in supplying the global economy with safe
stores of value. In turn, this builds a bridge between our paper and Caballero, Farhi and Gourin-
chas (2008). Like this earlier work, our analysis indicates that global imbalances may stem from a
shortage of assets in emerging countries. But unlike this earlier work, our analysis requires only a
shortage of the relatively safe assets, not of all assets. Indeed, emerging economies appear to be
producing a lot of assets in reality. Yet, most of these assets are risky and their residents seem
to be searching abroad for safer assets such as US Treasury securities. It is thus the shortage of
such “quality” assets, and not of all assets, that explains why ﬁnancial capital may be ﬂowing from
emerging countries to the United States and other advanced economies.
Finally, our analysis has distinct implication for aggregate TFP and growth dynamics. To see
this, note that along the transition from the autarchic to the integrated steady state, agents in
the South become increasingly willing to take risk. Like in our baseline mode, this is because the
increase in the interest rate induces agents in the South to accumulate more wealth. But now that
the agents face a choice between the safe sector and the risky, entrepreneurial sector, this increase
in the willingness to take risk also means a reallocation of resources from the safe sector to the more
risky, but also more eﬃcient, entrepreneurial sector. As this happens, the South enjoys an increase
in TFP. Conversely, because the North de-cumulates wealth and reallocates capital away from its
entrepreneurial sector, it experiences a drop in its TFP. This is illustrated in Figure 5, which shows
the dynamics of TFP in the two countries for a numerical version of the extended model.19
Along with our model’s prediction regarding current-account dynamics, this provides a simple
resolution to the empirical puzzle documented by Gourinchas and Jeanne (2008). This work showed
that, in the data, capital often appears to ﬂow from countries that experience higher productivity
growth to those that experience lower productivity growth. While this fact is inconsistent with the
standard neoclassical growth paradigm, it is easily accommodated in our model.20
8 Conclusion
This paper studies the global macroeconomic implications of ﬁnancial integration within a tractable
incomplete-markets model that features uninsurable idiosyncratic entrepreneurial risk—a friction
that introduces, not only a precautionary motive for saving, but also a wedge between the interest
rate and the marginal product of capital.
19The numerical exercise here assumes ~ 1 = ~ 2 = :50,  = 0:7, and (A1;A2) chosen so that in autarchy the capital
in the “safe sector” accounts for 50% of total capital in the North and for 20% of total capital in the South. Also, note
that TFP growth is negative in the North and positive in the South, but both countries could feature positive TFP
growth if we had allowed for an exogenous constant drift in technology. The robust prediction is that integration
speeds up TFP growth in the South while it slows it down in the North.
20In fact, if we focus on labor productivity (output per worker) rather than TFP, this statement holds true even
for our baseline model: along the transition from the autarchic to the integrated steady states, the South experiences
higher growth in physical capital and labor productivity than the North, and yet it is the North that is borrowing
from the South. The extension of this section helps reinforce this point by establishing a similar property for TFP.
28Because of this wedge, a ﬁnancially underdeveloped economy (“South” or “China”) can feature
both a lower interest rate and a lower capital stock under autarchy than a more advanced economy
(“North” or “US”). As the two economies open up their capital accounts, interest rates rise in the
South and fall in the North; the North starts running large current-account deﬁcits; and the South
suﬀers an outﬂow of capital. Over time, however, integration permits the South to accumulate more
wealth, in part by saving in the North. As this happens, the bite of the aforementioned friction
diminishes. Eventually, this helps boost capital accumulation and growth, thereby reducing cross-
country inequality in the long run. Combined, these results provide a simple explanation for the
emergence of global imbalances, a simple resolution to the empirical puzzle that capital often fails
to ﬂow from the rich or slow-growing to the poor or fast-growing countries, and a distinct set of
policy lessons regarding the intertemporal costs and beneﬁts of capital-account liberalization.
Underlying these ﬁndings are two key properties. First, a positive wedge between the marginal
product of capital and the risk-free rate. Second, the tendency of this wedge to diminish as wealth
increases. In our model, the ﬁrst property is due to uninsurable idiosyncratic investment risk; the
second property then follows from diminishing absolute risk aversion. Interestingly, these properties
may naturally emerge also in models with borrowing constraints. These models feature a positive
wedge between the marginal product of capital (“internal returns”) and the interest rate faced by
savers (“external returns”), either because constraints bind now or because they are expected to bind
in the future. What is more, this wedge typically falls with wealth, as more wealth helps overcome
current and future borrowing constraints. We thus conjecture that similar results would obtain in a
variant of our model that would introduce realistic borrowing constraints in addition to, or in place
of, the entrepreneurial risk that we have focused on in this paper.
299 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1 (individual policy rules). This result is essentially a variant of the Merton-
Samuelson optimal portfolio problem; see the proof of Proposition 1 in Angeletos and Panousi
(2009).
Proof of Proposition 1 (equilibrium dynamics). For simplicity, we drop the index j. Since
aggregate labor demand is
R
i ni
t =  n(!t)Kt and aggregate labor supply is 1, the labor market clears if
and only if  n(!t)Kt = 1: It follows that the equilibrium wage satisﬁes !t = FL (Kt;1) and, similarly,
the equilibrium mean return to capital satisﬁes  rt = FK (Kt;1)   : The bond market clears if and
only if Bt = 0. We deﬁne total eﬀective wealth for an agent i as the sum of his ﬁnancial wealth,




t + ht = xi
t + ht. Then, in general equilibrium of the autarchic economy,
Wt = Kt + Ht. Combining Xt = Kt + Bt with the aggregation of bond holdings from (8), gives
(14). Aggregating over the deﬁnition of human capital in Lemma 1, we get:






Expressing this in recursive form gives condition (13). Aggregating the household budget, which
can be written as dwi
t = [ rtki
t + Rt(bi
t + ht)   ci
t]dt + ki
tdzi
t, using the aggregated policy functions
from (8), using (9) and (13), and the fact that, in equilibrium,  rtKt + !t = F (Kt;1)   Kt; we get
the resource constraint (11). Finally, using Ct = mtWt; and therefore _ Ct=Ct = _ mt=mt + _ Wt=Wt,
together with (10) and the deﬁnition of ^ jt, gives the aggregate Euler condition (12).
Proof of Lemma 2. (i) The form of the function K is evident from condition (18), while the
form of the function B follows from condition (19).
(ii) Using our Cobb-Douglas assumption for the production function and equation (18), we





 1. It follows that KR has the same sign as 1
 1(R + 1). Since
(R) = (
2~ 2
1+ (   R))1=2 from (18), we get that R = ( 1
2
2~ 2
1+ )1=2(   R) 1=2. Using this, we
have that KR > 0 , R >    1
2
~ 2
+1  ^ R(~ ) <    R.
In addition, since _ Wt = tWt   Ct = (t   mt)Wt, where t  t rt + (1   t)Rt, wealth
stationarity requires  = m. Combining this with the Euler equation in steady state, we get:
 + 1
2
(f0(K)      R)   (   R) = 0 :
From this, and for steady-state capital to be lower than under complete markets, that is, for f0(K) 
30 > , it has to be the case that:
 + 1
2
(   R)   (   R) < 0 ;
which, since    R > 0, gives  > =(2   ) or  < =( + 1) .





 1, it follows that K~  has the same sign as  ~ . Since (R) =
(
2~ 2




1+ ) 1=2(   R). Using this, we have that K~  < 0.
(iv) From (19) we have that:







Consider the limits of B as R ! 0+ and R !  : Note that (0) = (
2~ 2
1+ )1=2 is ﬁnite and hence
both (0) and K(0) are ﬁnite. It follows that:
lim







+ 1)K(0) =  1 :
Furthermore, () = 0, implying () = 0 and K() = (f0)
 1 () is ﬁnite. It follows that:
lim






+ 1)K() = +1 :
Next, note that, from (21):
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Since 0 (R) < 0 and R < f0 (K (R)) for all R 2 (0;), we have that @B=@R > 0 for all R 2 (0;).
















31where ~  =   1
~ 2(
2( R)
(1+) )1=2 and ~  = (
2( R)
1+ )1=2. Substituting this into @B
@~  > 0 yields:
R >
2(1   )
 + (2   )
 R
¯
<  R   :
Proof that the ﬁrst part of Assumption 1 implies its second part. Using the deﬁnitions
of ^ R and R
¯
, we get:
^ R < R
¯
, ~  <
2(1 + )
( + (2   ))
:
In this region of interest rates, KR > 0, and therefore  < =(1 + ). Next, let f(K) = K,

















^ f0K= ^ f   K= ^ f





For ~  very small,  '  s
1 s, which implies that KR > 0 ,  s
1 s < 
1+ .
Proof of Proposition 2. (i) The equation B(Raut
j ; ~ j) = 0 is simply bond market clearing
for each country. Under Assumption 1, we are in the region where B~  > 0. From (20) we have
that B = B=K  D. Using a proof similar to that in Lemma 2(iv), we get that DR < 0. Hence,
BR < 0. We also have that B~  = BRR~  > 0, with BR < 0. Therefore, it has to be that R~  < 0 in
autarchy. In other words, Raut
1 > Raut
2 .
(ii) This part follows from the proof of Lemma 2, part (iii). The limits of B(R), together with
the continuity of B (R) in R; establish the existence of an R that solves B(R) = 0: This is in fact
the unique steady-state R, since BR > 0 always.









Proof of Proposition 3. (i) Consider the function WB(R) deﬁned by:
WB(R)  B(R; ~ 1)K(R; ~ 1) + B(R; ~ 2)K(R; ~ 2) :
An integrated steady state is given by any solution to WB(R) = 0. Note that the function K is
always positively valued, while the function B can take both signs and is increasing in R and ~ .
32Furthermore, recall that Raut
2 < Raut
1 . Whenever R  Raut
2 (< Raut
1 ), by the monotonicity of B
in R we have that B(R; ~ 2)  B(Raut
2 ; ~ 2) = 0 and B(R; ~ 1) < B(Raut
2 ; ~ 2) = 0; it follows that
WB(R) < 0. Similarly, whenever R  Raut
1 , we have that WB(R) > 0. Along with the fact that
the function WB(R) is continuous in R, this implies that a solution Rint to WB(R) = 0 always
exists and it necessarily satisﬁes Raut
2 < Rint < Raut
1 .
(ii) Under Assumption 1, we are in the area where B~  > 0, which implies that Bint
1 < Bint
2 , and
since the world bond market has to clear, this means that Bint
1 < 0 < Bint
2 .
(iii) Since K~  < 0, it follows that Kint
1 > Kint
2 . Since Assumption 1 ensures that KR > 0, and
using (i), we get the desired result.
(iv) This part follows directly from parts (ii) and (iii).
Details on demographics. In order to guarantee the existence of a stationary wealth dis-
tribution, we slightly modify the baseline model setup so that all households now face a constant
probability of death, with Poisson arrival rate v dt at every instant in time. There is no intergenera-
tional altruism linking a household to its descendants, and utility is zero after death. The discount
rate in preferences can then be reinterpreted as  = ~ +v, where ~  is the psychological or subjective
discount rate and v is the probability of death.
In order to isolate the eﬀects of entrepreneurial risk, we assume that agents can still freely





because there exist annuity ﬁrms permitting all agents to get insurance against mortality risk. Then,
_ hjt = (Rjt + v)hjt   !jt. If we let bjt =  hjt, then _ bjt = Rjtbjt   vhjt + !jt. These equations are
consistent with each other and with market clearing, and they have two alternative but isomorphic
interpretations. First, at the beginning of time, every worker borrows from the annuity ﬁrms an
amount equal to his entire human capital. From then on, he repays this debt every period by giving
up his wage plus interest to the annuity ﬁrms, which only stops when he dies. Second, the annuity
ﬁrms borrow from the worker his entire human capital, and every period from then on repay this
by giving him a wage plus interest, until he dies.
At each point in time, the agents who die are replaced by newborn agents who are endowed with
the average wealth of the exiting agents, which is the same as the mean wealth in the economy.
Hence, each agent starts life with the sum of the mean wealth plus his human wealth.
Note that for v = 0 Ricardian equivalence holds in our baseline model, because all agents
can freely borrow in the riskless bond. However, in general, with ﬁnite lives (v > 0) and no
altruism, Ricardian equivalence might fail. Nonetheless, because of the way wealth is transmitted
to the newborn agents here, Ricardian equivalence approximately holds in our setup for v positive
but small. Hence, in the characterization of the general equilibrium when v > 0 we continue to
33Change in GDP
Impact Long run
South North South North
baseline  1:6 1:0 3:3  2:0
~ 2 = 0:6  2:7 1:1 5:9  2:6
 = 0:7  9:9 2:7 9:5  2:7
~ 2 = 0:6; = 0:7  16:1 1:7 19:4  2:8
~ 2 : 0:4 ! 0:2 22:0 0:00 23:4 0:00
Table 5: Output eﬀects. This table presents the eﬀects of ﬁnancial integration on GDP for both
countries, on the impact of ﬁnancial integration and in the long run (at the new integrated-world
steady state), for the baseline model parameterizations, for three alternative parameterizations, and
for an alternative reform exercise. See the main text for details on the exercises.
write the government budget constraint (11) as in the main text. However, equation (13) becomes
_ Hjt = (Rjt + v)Hjt   !jt.
In sum, our theoretical steady-state results for the aggregates are derived for v = 0 in the
baseline model, but they carry through when we allow for v small but positive. Finally, for the com-
plete characterization of the steady-state invariant wealth distribution, see Panousi (2010). The
entrepreneurial wealth distribution is characterized by a second-order linear diﬀerential equation.
The model captures the empirically observed fact that the wealth distribution displays higher in-
equality than the consumption distribution. Wealth inequality increases with risk. The wealth
distribution exhibits a thick right tail (thicker than the corresponding tails generated by benchmark
models of idiosyncratic labor-income risk alone), as a result of the random walk component that
uninsurable investment risk introduces in entrepreneurial returns.
Output eﬀects. Table 5 presents the eﬀects on GDP on the impact of integration and in the
long run (at the new integrated-world steady state), for the baseline parameterization of the model,
for three variant parameterization, and for an alternative reform exercise, for both countries. See
the main text for details on the alternative parameterizations and exercises. The numbers in the
table are percent changes from the autarchic GDP levels.
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Figure 1: Steady state. This ﬁgure illustrates the determination of the autarchic and integrated
steady states. The interest rate is on the horizontal axis, the net foreign asset position of a country
is on the vertical axis. The solid line is the function B(R) for the North. The dashed line is the
function B(R) for the South. The intersection of these curves with the zero line gives the autarchic
interest rates, where Raut
2 < Raut
1 . The integrated interest rate, Rint, falls in between the two
autarchic values.
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(a) Aggregate Capital Stock























(c) Labor Productivity and Wage






























(f) Net Foreign Asset Position
Figure 2: South’s dynamic adjustment to ﬁnancial integration. This ﬁgure illustrates the
transition of the South from its autarchic steady state to the integrated one. Time in years is on
the horizontal axis. Integration occurs at time zero. The dotted line indicates the value of the
variables in the autarchic steady state. The dashed line indicates the value of the variables in the
integrated steady state. The solid line indicates the dynamic path of the variables. Capital, output,
consumption, and the wage are normalized by the corresponding autarchy values of the North. The
net foreign asset position is given as a fraction of contemporaneous GDP.










(a) Aggregate Capital Stock



















(c) Labor Productivity and Wage


























(f) Net Foreign Asset Position
Figure 3: North’s dynamic adjustment to ﬁnancial integration. This ﬁgure illustrates the
transition of the North from its autarchic steady state to the integrated one. time zero. The dotted
line indicates the value of the variables in the autarchic steady state. The dashed line indicates the
value of the variables in the integrated steady state. The solid line indicates the dynamic path of
the variables. Capital, output, consumption, and the wage are normalized by their corresponding
autarchy values. The net foreign asset position is given as a fraction of contemporaneous GDP.







































































(a) Welfare Gains/Losses for the South







































































(b) Welfare Gains/Losses for the North
Figure 4: Welfare eﬀects. This ﬁgure illustrates the welfare eﬀects of ﬁnancial integration across
diﬀerent wealth levels. The horizontal axis measures wealth in terms of percentiles of the autarchic
steady-state distributions. The vertical axis measures the welfare gains (positive numbers) or losses
(negative numbers), evaluated as percent of individual permanent income. The solid line represents
the welfare eﬀects for the current generation (the eﬀects that obtain by evaluating welfare at the
time of reform); the dashed line represents the welfare eﬀects for future generations (the eﬀects that
obtain from comparing welfare across the two steady states).









(a) TFP of South







(b) TFP of North
Figure 5: TFP dynamics. This ﬁgure illustrates the dynamic adjustment of TFP to ﬁnancial
integration, within the context of the extended model. Time in years is on the horizontal axis.
Integration occurs at time zero. The TFP of each country, normalized by its corresponding value
at the integrated steady state, is on the vertical axis.
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